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Rethinking Histories of Resistance in Brazil and Mexico

In this chapter I offer a general discussion of 'resistance', drawing on the rich set of examples provided in the rest of the book. I do not attempt a detailed resumé of those examples and at times I range beyond Brazil and Mexico. I should at the outset clarify that, as a historian of Mexico, I know much less about Brazil than about Mexico, and much less about anthropology than history. While these two disciplines share a measure of kinship within the great extended family of the social sciences, they are second cousins rather than siblings, hence - notwithstanding some successful 'anthrohistorical' marriages (Friedrich, 1986; Nugent, 1993) - their debates, methodologies and conceptual armouries differ; to put it more bluntly, while history generates plenty of debates (usually of a specific, low-to-middle range kind), it is usually methodologically, theoretically and conceptually poorer; although I would see this as a genteel kind of poverty, the product of modest wants rather than intellectual bankruptcy. I mention this in light of my later discussion of concepts, which may seem both ignorant and dismissive. Finally, it may also be that historians, who frequently deal with dead and distant people, tend to lack the sense of social and political engagement which many anthropologists, bound to 'their' communities by ties of experience, affection and solidarity, not only display, but actively defend. (I touch on this in conclusion).

1. Definitions

The central concept of the project is 'resistance', which will also form the theme of this commentary. 'Resistance' is a protean concept, which, it seems, can accommodate a vast range of phenomena ('from revolutions to hairstyles': Hollander and Einwohner, 2004: 534). When we try to pin down protean concepts of this kind, we can try different strategies. One strategy, evident in some chapters, is to explore the etymology of the word. However, etymology is often a risky guide (consider, for example, 'revolution', which now
means almost the opposite of what it first meant). In physics, resistance
denotes 'a component's opposition to the flow of electric charge' (Oxford,
1990: 240), hence it suggests a kind of static opposition to a dynamic force,
which is hardly the way that contemporary 'resistance theory' conceives of its
subject. An alternative, perhaps 'genealogical' approach, would be to inquire
into the paternity of the concept: when and why was it born. Here, there
seems to be a measure of consensus. Resistance theory - or, more loosely,
the notion of resistance - is a relatively recent construct, which helped fill a
gap left by the decline of cognate theories/notions, while responding to events
in the 'real world' (as they were perceived). These theories/notions included:
class and class consciousness; class-based movements, including 'social
revolutions', the grand metanarrative of dialectical materialism; and 'really
existing socialism' (Gledhill and Gutmann, this volume). Their decline, linked
to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the 'Second World', the atrophy of
Marxism, and the corresponding 'triumph' of neo-liberalism, left a conceptual
vacuum, chiefly on the left, into which flowed several new - or newly named -
conceptual currents: those of the 'new social movements', 'identity' (as
opposed to class) politics, and bottom-up, incremental, and decentralized
political mobilization (as opposed to top-down, revolutionary, vanguardist
mobilization). In a time when radical and progressive 'dreams [had] lost their
lustre' (Brown, 1996: 729), resistance theory offered a different perspective,
alloyed to a dose of optimism.

In Brazil and Mexico, in particular, the so-called 'new social movements' of
the 1980s and '90s played a part in challenging the political status quo, as
represented by declining authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, while
raising the profile of key issues (such as land in Brazil; debt and public
services in Mexico) and displaying the capacity of 'civil society' to act
independently of a sclerotic state (for example, after the Mexico City
earthquake of September 1985). Of course, there was also a good deal of
slippage between the political and academic worlds. With the restoration - or
establishment, de novo - of electoral democracy, political parties and elections
acquired greater clout, especially when leftist parties proved capable of
winning national - or, as in Mexico City, major 'regional' - elections. By the turn of the century, the 'new social movement' boom was waning, certainly in the academic world, probably in the 'real' world too. But, given the accumulated inertia of research programmes, doctoral degrees, academic appointments and funding priorities, academic trends take time to adjust. Even if it turns out that we are living in 1929 and the current global financial crisis portends an imminent period of depression, socio-economic protest, renewed populism, and outright revolt, the academy will probably continue churning out studies of identity politics and the culture-of-inexorable-globalization for years to come. Just as generals fight the last war, so social scientists tend to cluster in the familiar terrain of their intellectual coming-of-age.

Whatever the causes of the shift, there is little doubt that the grand leftist 'metanarratives' of the 1960s and '70s gave way, during the 1980s and '90s, to more modest, 'de-centred' mini-narratives. In my own field (Mexican revolutionary studies), the great unitary Revolution became 'many revolutions', if not just 'a great rebellion'; and other great revolutions - the English, the French - were similarly cut down to size (Knight, 1992). Our theoretical bearings also shifted: studies of 'great' or 'social' revolutions (Brinton, 1938; Moore, 1966; Wolf, 1969), which posited grand global patterns of causality, 'stages' and outcomes, gave way to more particularist approaches, which asked not only 'Why Men Rebel' (a title Gurr would probably not get away with today) but also 'why men and women do not rebel' (Gurr, 1970); thus, why they comply, albeit grudgingly, or seek small respites and advantages without challenging the entire edifice of power. James Scott's shift from the political economic of peasant revolution (1976) to the 'weapons of the weak' (1985) exemplified this shift: not, I think, because Scott had radically changed his mind, but rather because he had switched his focus (from the macropolitics of revolutionary Vietnam in the 1940s and '50s to the micropolitics of conservative Malaysia in the 1960s and '70s); and this new focus happened to suit the mood of the times. Hence the 'weapons of the weak' became - like 'imagined communities' and 'invented traditions' - a reiterated mantra, even among those, I suspect, who had never read the eponymous book.
As tends to happen when grand metanarratives collapse, the ensuing (partial vacuum) sucks in a host of competing mini-narratives. Or, to change the metaphor, the extinction of supposed conceptual dinosaurs (social revolution, socialism, dependency) favoured the rapid evolution of a swarm of small, busy, burrowing mammalian competitors. One of those - 'resistence' - has now grown to substantial proportions; it is, perhaps, the elephant of the post-Jurassic era. But, as a reading of these chapters makes clear, 'resistence' consorts and competes with a host of other post-Jurassic concepts, some of quite ancient pedigree, some relatively new mutations whose fitness for survival remains moot. Thus, I encountered:

(i) **big, old concepts** which survived the mass extinction (if I were to do my evolutionary metaphor to death I might call them sharks): elite, power, hegemony and counter-hegemony, legitimacy, democracy, culture and subculture, domination, subordination, mentality, modernity, ethnicity, utopianism, populism, clientelism, citizenship, false consciousness;

(ii) **big new concepts** which have sprung up and multiplied, mammalian-fashion, alongside 'resistence': agency, subalternity, alterity, imaginary, identity, negotiation, metanarrative, transnationality and postmodernity. And, finally,

(iii) **small new concepts** struggling to survive and procreate: governmentality, materiality, horizontality, translocality, transutopian, transbehavioral, varieties of power ('vertical' and 'oblique'), varieties of resistance ('endo' and 'exo'), polinucleated power field; and so on. We might call them the conceptual voles of the post-Jurassic.

The point about this quick semantic census is not to rehash old arguments about the utility - or disutility - of jargon and neologisms, nor for me to play the predictable part of the down-to-earth, common-sensical, 'call-a-spade-a-spade' historian. There are plenty of occasions when jargon and neologisms
can be useful (Knight 2002: 148-9). Rather, the point is to flag the risks of such semantic fecundity. The purpose of concepts, I assume, is to help us understand the world, past and present. (Here, I would echo Viqueira: 'me confieso, de entrada un nominalista impenitente': Viqueira, this volume). For a concept to help, it should be reasonably clear and consensual: clear, so that its meaning cannot be endlessly and aimlessly contested; and consensual, in that there is some broad agreement among scholars as to what that meaning is, or might be, so that they can constructively deploy it in debate. Of the list presented above, the first category (the sharks) consists of concepts which, being old and familiar, come with a lot of theoretical baggage; but for that reason we can unpack the baggage and achieve some measure of clarity. Thus: my conception of the state is Marxist or Weberian or Thomist or whatever. Or: when I refer to democracy I mean representative liberal democracy on the lines of Dahl's polyarchy (Dahl, 1971). Even if, since one politólogo's 'polyarchy' may be another's 'bourgeois democracy', we do not achieve complete consensus, we at least know roughly where we are coming from, hence debate need not proceed along multiple parallel paths which never meet.

To my way of thinking, the second and third categories (elephants and voles), have not acquired the same baggage; they are travelling light and can be rather skittishly evasive. Category (ii) we encounter quite frequently, but we do not know if, between encounters, the concept has remained constant. When political scientists refer to polyarchy, citing Dahl, we know pretty much what they mean (and, if we have doubts, we can read Dahl); similarly, we can, with some confidence, refer to 'Weberian' legitimacy, 'Gramscian' hegemony, 'Marxist' bourgeois democracy. Category (ii) concepts, however, though nowadays familiar, are, as yet, ill-defined, 'insufficiently theorized'. Hence their proliferation, especially their careless and unexplained proliferation, tends to generate confusion. A fortiori, category (iii) concepts, being new, unfamiliar and (often) unexplained, are not conducive to comprehension and enlightenment. Perhaps they will eventually make the grade and achieve promotion to category (ii) concepts - that is, they will catch on and become
familiar, if still somewhat inscrutable, conceptual friends. Eventually, given
time and effort, they make it all the way to category (i) status, as established,
proven, 'successful' concepts.8

I draw three conclusions from this superficial semantic overview: first, as
that good nominalist William of Ockham said a long time ago, we should not
multiply concepts, unless we think they are really necessary; so, we should
resist overpopulating category (iii); second, as and when category (iii)
concepts acquire currency - become successful 'memes', as Dawkins et al.
would say (Blackmore, 1999) - we should make sure to debate and define
what they mean; thus, finally, we should try to promote category (ii) concepts
to category (i), which means supplying them with clear, useful, consensual
definitions and, no less important, the attendant bibliography which enables
those definitions to be achieved - definitions being, to my mind, not a priori
Platonic notions, but working formulations based on the creative interplay of
theory and practice. Perhaps one practical outcome of this book might be to
promote - or, at least, make a case for promotion - of the concept of
'resistance' from category (ii) status (familiar but vague and contested) to
category (i) (familiar but bolstered by useful theoretical and practical
knowledge). Thus, we turn an elephant into a shark.

2. Typologies

So, I now turn to the central concept of resistance: how we might understand,
describe, and compare it across time and place. Given that - as these
chapters show - 'resistance' is a protean phenomenon, capable of assuming
many guises, it seems to me unavoidable that we break it down into
categories or subtypes. I stress that this is not an exercise in simple pigeon-
holding; in almost all cases, the distinctions which follow form part of continua,
not discrete categories. Furthermore, the presentation of the typology enables
me to touch on a range of topics, drawn from what are rich but very diverse
case studies. (As will become clear, I make no pretence of synthesizing the
papers into a comprehensive analysis, which, I suspect, would fail to do
justice to their diversity).
2.i. Emic/etic

I start with a basic distinction between resistance defined by contemporary actors and that defined \textit{ex post facto} by scholars (we could play around with 'subjective/objective' and 'emic/etic' labels). For historians, this distinction is often crucial; for contemporary analysts - anthropologists and sociologists, for example - it may be less salient. On the other hand, the latter can probe motivation more effectively than the former, since historians often have to infer motivations from behaviour. Thus, when we ask whether actors conceive of their actions as 'resistant' or not, historians may be hard put to provide answers. There is an additional, crucial, and arguably neglected point: in - again, emic or subjective - terms: do thetargets of resistance discern 'resistance'? Thus, do employers, landlords or state officials (let's, for the moment, call them 'elites') identify certain actions - usually, 'subaltern' actions - as 'resistant'?9 (As I go on to note, the severity of 'resistance' may vary - from relatively trivial obstruction to wholesale rebellion, even revolution). It is, I think, historically common for elites to exaggerate (subaltern) resistance, to make it sound more extreme and bloodcurdling than it 'really' was.10 They may do this for tactical reasons, in order to smear their opponents and, perhaps, to justify top-down repression. In Latin America, as in the United States, varieties of the 'Red Scare' have been apparent since 1917 (Deutsch, 1999). But, quite often, exaggerated fears seem to be quite genuine: hence the Grand Peur of the French Revolution (Lefebvre, 1973 [1932]), or the fears of chilangos that, when the Zapatistas entered Mexico City in 1914, they would all be murdered in their beds. Which, of course, did not happen (Womack, 1969: 219). Indeed, it may be that tactical elite scare-mongering serves to stoke the fires of - genuine - elite fear: just as elites - perhaps - come to believe their own high-minded and self-justifying 'public transcripts' (about good government, paternalism and \textit{noblesse oblige}: Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1984: 3) so, too, perhaps, they come to believe their own alarmist scare stories. A key consequence is that popular radicalism - by which I mean radicalism of both goals and methods (see below) - is often exaggerated, as it was, initially at least, in the case of the Zapatistas. To the extent that
(historical) sources tend to be produced by elites, they may sometimes display a systemic bias in favour of subaltern radicalism. I am not sure if any such bias exists in the anthropological literature, which tends to focus on the agents of resistance - the subalterns - rather than the targets (the elites). This preliminary distinction leads immediately to a second, which is perhaps more relevant, at least to the cases we are dealing with.

2.ii. Intentionality

Does resistance have to be **intentional** to qualify as resistance? Some scholars are firmly of this view (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004: 542-3; Castro Gutiérrez, this volume). If the putative 'resisters' do not think that they are 'resisting' - that they are not, in other words, mounting some sort of concerted or considered challenge to their superiors, a challenge which is, perhaps, 'counter-hegemonic' (Seymour, 2006: 305) - then, some say, it is meaningless to talk of 'resistance' which, they further say, must be deliberate and purposive, not simply an unconscious by-product of behaviour which lacks any such underlying motive. I agree that motives are important, but they are hard to get at (especially for historians). Who is say whether petty stealing and footdragging are 'really' intentional 'resistance', even 'counter-hegemonic resistance' (Scott, 1990: 188)? Intentions are hard to get at not just for want of raw data (historians may find it hard to 'open windows into men's souls', as Queen Elizabeth I put it, but anthropologists in the field can at least try); it is also a question of 'indexicality' - that is to say, a question of what people might themselves understand by 'resistance', however that term is translated.11

However, outcomes are even more important, they tend to be more accessible, and they may hinge upon 'unintentional' as well as intentional resistance. Or, as sometimes happens in history, 'unintentional' consequences exceed conscious intentions (modest ambitions may spawn grand outcomes; though, even more often in history, grand ambitions spawn modest outcomes).12 The consequences of unintentional resistance can be seen in several contrasting contexts. For example, several scholars stress the importance of solidarity: beliefs and practices which foster solidarity can -
potentially or actually - fortify 'resistance'. Thus, *candomblé* may facilitate resistance even if its practitioners do not conceive of it as inherently contestational (Parés, this volume). (Again, elites may still feel threatened, and thus perceive resistance, where none is intended). Similarly, in times of war, popular resistance to conscription, culminating in mass desertion, can undermine not only armes, but entire empires (such as the Russian) (Scott, 1986: 6). A contrasting example - admittedly far removed from our comparison - concerns trade union activity. At the height of trade union militancy in the UK in the 1970s, it was plausibly argued that wage claims, backed up by effective strike action, were eroding profits and pushing companies to the wall, even threatening a systemic crisis of UK capitalism (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972). While some employers - and some government ministers - alleged that militant unionists were consciously bent on such an outcome, this was almost certainly not the case: the 'objective' radicalism of potential outcome (declining profits and, eventually, a capitalist crisis) far outran the 'subjective' radicalism of most union-members, who were seeking better pay and job protection, not the destruction of capitalism. Of course, the experiment was not allowed to run its course, since, following the 'winter of discontent' in 1979, the Thatcher government came to power, intent on breaking the power of the unions, which it did.

It is hard to say, in cases like these, whether objective (system-threatening) consequences arose from circumstances in which purposive (subaltern) resistance was either absent or, perhaps, present but less radical, in subjective terms, than the objective outcomes, potential or actual. In other words, Brazilian slaves or British workers may have subjectively entertained notions of 'resistance', loosely defined, without intending to mount the kind of objective threat to the system which they did (or, recalling my previous point, which elites believed that they did). To go back to the Zapatistas again: the original Plan of Ayala of 1911 was a moderate document which conceded the sugar plantation a major place in Morelos society; the Zapatistas initially sought to adjust the balance between village and hacienda which had been drastically upset by thirty years of the Pax Porfiriana. As Womack begins his
classic study: 'this is a book about country people who did not want to move and therefore got into a revolution. They did not figure on so odd a fate' (Womack, 1969: ix). However, the moderate Zapatista challenge was bitterly resisted and the result was Zapatista radicalization leading to Zapatista revolution. Again, the objective outcome - the eventual destruction of the Morelos sugar estates - went beyond initial subjective goals (a common enough consequence in revolutions: Skocpol, 1979: 17-18). This brings me to my third distinction.

2.iii: Radicalism and thresholds

If intentionality counts, it seems reasonable to ask how radical intentions are. Or, to put it differently, is the 'resistance' in question trivial, limited, moderate, militant, radical, root-and-branch, or even revolutionary? A great deal of recent 'resistance' studies concerns actions which are fairly low-key, discreet, evasive, and quotidian (i.e., the famous 'weapons of the weak': Scott, 1985). Quite rightly, I think, social scientists have shifted their attention from the great rebellions and revolutions - the relatively rare thunderstorms of resistance - in order to focus on smaller, more extensive and, perhaps, cumulative events: by analogy, the 'normal' rainfall patterns over years and decades. This shift raises some interesting questions and problems. First, as several scholars point out, there is a risk of diluting the concept of 'resistance' (Brown, 1996: 730; Gutmann, 2002: 42, 114). All societies embody a measure of conflict; should we dignify every example as a case of 'resistance', thus 'lumping' phenomena which should be 'split', while at the same time exaggerating social conflict at the expense of social cooperation and cohesion (Brown, 1996: 729, 734)? To put it differently: what threshold must be crossed for a minor conflict to qualify as 'resistance'? (The same question has been asked in the related context of the 'new social movements': Foweraker, 1995: 24-5).

I have already suggested that (i) (subaltern) intention (ii) (elite) perception and (iii) objective consequences are all relevant but not necessarily commensurate. If, for example, a single sharecropper, fallen on hard times, breaks habit and conceals a fraction of his crop from the landlord, not out of
any clear or conscious intention of challenging the landlord's authority; if, in addition, the landlord remains unaware; and if, this concealment being a rare occurrence, which sharecroppers in general do not emulate, it remains an isolated case and poses no objective threat to the profitability of the enterprise; then it seems rather a stretch to call this 'resistance', thus to include the event in the same category as strikes, land reform petitions, tomas de tierras and rebellions, all of which are acts of deliberate confrontation, as well as being overt, collective, organized and, in many cases, sustained (Tarrow, 1994:4-6). We could, by way of contrast, refer to the sharecropper's action as 'pilfering' (an action which can be individual, self-interested, clandestine, and lacking any normative motivation);14 or, more positively, as a 'survival strategy' (Ortner, 1995: 174-5). Of course, if the sharecropper makes a habit of it (and gets away with it); if the idea catches on and other sharecroppers follow suit (thus, individual actions acquire a collective character, involving horizontal solidarity); if the profitability of the hacienda suffers and the landlord tries to stop it, then we enter a situation of clearcut resistance and conflict, as the cotton plantations of Mexico's Laguna region did during the late Porfiriato and Revolution (O'Hea, 1966).

My cautious conclusion would be that, while it is valid to stress intentionality, we should probably not make intentionality a necessary criterion of resistance, given that (1) it is often difficult to probe motives anyway, especially for historians; (2) elite perceptions also matter and, if resistance, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, then elite beholders should also be taken into account; and, finally, (3) cumulative pilfering might, at some murky point in the process, eventually become a form of discreet collective action which might combine solidarity, intent, organization and, most important, practical consequences.

The preceding discussion concerns the lower threshold, at which, for example, pilfering becomes resistance. Should we also demarcate an upper threshold, where resistance - with its connotations of low-level, evasive, 'moderate' action, action characteristic of the 'weapons of the weak' - gives way to more extreme, overt, violent, and radical protest, the kind of protest
which, a generation ago, drew sociologists and social historians like moths to a flame (Moore, 1966; Wolf, 1969; Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975). Again, the answer to this question is partly heuristic and semantic: we can opt for very wide definitions of resistance stretching from, say, petty pilfering to outright social revolution; or we can try to achieve greater precision by slicing up the continuum, either by introducing new terms (revolt, revolution: there is an ample, if somewhat dated, bibliography) or by introducing important qualifiers to the portmanteau term 'resistance'. Jean Meyer has usefully done this with his distinction between Resistenz and Widerstand, the latter denoting more open, radical, and violent confrontation (Meyer, this volume; in the same spirit, Castro Guitiérrez, this volume, following de Vos, offers a triple typology: open, concealed and negotiated resistance). For our purposes, this is probably the right approach: first, because it broadens, instead of restricting, our field of comparison; and, second, because, in actual historical processes, the location and character of the upper threshold, where 'resistance' becomes 'revolt', and where the metaphorical 'weapons of the weak' are traded in for real machetes, Winchesters and AK47s, may not represent such a clearcut liminal point as we might imagine.

It is not clearcut because, I think, the shift from moderate to radical resistance/protest, or from Resistenz to Widerstand, may in fact conceal several different and overlapping transitions: it can denote:

(i) a shift in means (in what Tilly calls the actors' 'repertoire of contention': Tilly, 1986: 390): from peaceful to violent, covert to overt, local to national, individual to collective, sporadic to sustained (Tarrow 1994: 4-5, 31-2);

(ii) a shift in ends: from petty, self-interested 'pilfering' (alibit pilfering as an individual survival stratgey) at one extreme all the way up to ambitious, even Utopian, projects of social transformational at the other; and/or

(iii) a shift in social relations, as low-level skirmishing gives way to broader and deeper social conflict, as - irrespective of the ends/means criteria (i) and (ii) - the stakes of the conflict become much greater, the social polarization sharper, the sheer exuberance of contention more palpable.15
These three 'shifts' may coincide, as they have done in some major revolutions and rebellions, when conflict intensifies, goals become more radical, and social polarization - some of a distinctly expressive kind - snowballs. This - rather rare - triple conjunction is neatly summed up in the notion of 'the World Turned Upside Down' (Hill, 1975).

But usually there is no such triple conjunction. Consider some of the possible permutations. A protest may be violent, but relatively modest and moderate in terms of its goals (for example, most village riots in colonial Mexico: Taylor, 1979; Castro Gutiérrez, this volume); thus, the authorities can make some pragmatic concessions, the social polarization - and consequent repression - remain limited; and the system trundles on much as before. (We could compare this classic Mesoamerican pattern with the much more extensive, ideologically radical, and socially polarizing revolts which affected Andean America in the late colonial period; and which, of course, elicited savage repression: Flores Galindo, 1994; Walker, 1999).

On the other hand, some non-violent movements - examples of Resistenz rather than Widerstand - have entertained radical, system-changing goals: British Chartism in the early nineteenth century, for example (Tilly, 1995); Mahatma Gandhi's Quit India movement; or, perhaps less radical, but still system-threatening, while at the same time non-violent, the mass strikes which occurred in São Paulo's ABC region in the late 1970s and early '80s (French, 1992). Picking up on Jean Meyer's case study, I would hazard the view that Catholic opposition to the Mexican revolutionary state was more durably successful in the 1930s, when Resistenz prevailed, than it had been in the 1920s, when, in the form of the Cristiada, Widerstand was the preferred strategy. For that, Patience Schell's redoubtable damas católicas can claim some of the credit (Schell, this volume).

Perhaps a general rule of thumb can be advanced: in many cases, where the authorities enjoy superior coercive power, as they usually do, a commitment to violent protest plays into the authorities' hands, since they can resort to force on the basis of 'tit-for-tat', claiming, after the manner of Weber, that they should enjoy a 'monopoly of the legitimate use of force' and that
dissidents who infringe that monopoly deserve harsh treatment. (Needless to say, the authorities usually invoke a range of other justifications: for example, portraying political rebels as mere bandits: e.g., Womack, 1969: 72, 106-7, 121, 138, 166). Thus, as Tarrow observes, violence 'gives authorities a mandate for repression' (Tarrow, 1994: 104), and may even make repression politically acceptable (in the eyes of many, including many non-elite actors). Perhaps for this reason, the old Anarchist tactic of 'propaganda by the deed' has not usually been noticeably successful (Ford, 1982: 4-5; Hobsbawm, 1982: 15); nor, I would add, have political assassinations or recent terrorist plots, in respect of the supposed goals of the plotters.17 More important, it is for this reason that 'death by government' ('democide') has been much more extreme and extensive in Latin America than 'death by revolution' or 'death by subversion' (Rummel, 1994).18

Of course, the context is crucial. In the face of Nazi anti-Semitism, Germany's Jewish community adopted a generally pacific, legalist stance which tragically failed; in occupied Denmark, however, passive resistance helped save almost the entire (admittedly small) Jewish population (Kurlansky, 2007 :134). Most regimes, and not just liberal-democratic regimes, entertain some notion of proportionate response (analogous, we might say, to the notion of 'just war', which also transcends particular regime-types: Walzer, 1992). Proportionate response means - if only for reasons of regime self-interest19 - trying to counter non-violent protest with non-violent (legal, political, 'ideological', including religious) means. Thus, the 1660 Tehuantepec rebellion was allegedly calmed by the bishop, who paraded through the town 'in full pontifical robes', as erstwhile rebels prostrated themselves before him (Hamnett, 1971:13; compare Rude, 1980, 48-9, for a late-medieval German precedent). Proportionate response also means not gratuitously massacring civilians, especially women and children; Catholic activists in revolutionary Mexico, being well aware of this, sometimes placed women in the front line (literally) of civic protests (Schell, pers. comm.). The significance of the Tlatelolco massacre of October 1968 was not just that Mexican citizens were killed by the forces of the state, but that those citizens
were peaceful demonstrators, mostly young urban middle-class students, and that they were killed in the middle of Mexico City. The Mexican state had been killing peasant activists out in the sticks for decades (Gutiérrez, 1998; Castellanos, 2007); but those victims were more easily depicted as violent subversives than the students of 1968; they were more expendable, they got what they deserved. Once resistance turns violent, or is seen to turn violent, the gloves come off and the state can resort to its - usually superior - coercive power with less fear of criticism or reprisal (e.g., Gledhill, this volume, on Atenco). It was for this reason that the Díaz regime had little difficulty in quashing the small, radical, clandestine and insurrectionary PLM in 1906 and 1908; but was at a loss how to deal with the mass-based, peaceful protest of Madero's Anti-Reelectionists in 1909-10 (Knight, 1986, I: chap.2). I am not asserting that peaceful resistance is in all cases a preferable strategy; the character of the regime - Habsburg, Bourbon, British colonial, Nazi, PRIísta - clearly makes a big difference. But I would hazard the view that many regimes, when faced with challenges-from-below, would almost prefer a gloves-off, violent challenge to one that is peaceful, civilian, and 'moderate'. And it is a common strategy of regimes to try to provoke their opponents into ill-advised violence.

2.iv. Who resists?

So far, I have discussed definitions of resistance; the question of intentionality; and degrees of radicalism (upper and lower thresholds). An additional concern must be the sociopolitical make-up of resistance and, logically, the sociopolitical make-up of the targets of resistance. While it may seem otiose to spell it out, there is clearly an assumption throughout most of these chapters that we are talking about popular or subaltern resistance, what might reasonably be called the resistance of 'common folk' (Eckstein, 1989:1). Generically and semantically, 'resistance' need not be so limited. Powerful vested interests in Mexico 'resisted' Cárdenas's reforms, as they did Goulart's populist policies in 1960s Brazil. Cárdenas bent with the wind; or, as some historians now say, he made some tactical retreats when confronted by
the 'weapons of the strong': that is, not armed right-wing insurrections (which, like Cedillo's, were few and futile), but more subtle stratagems of capital flight, propaganda, political lobbying and activism. It was to this conjuncture of anti-Cárdenas resistance that we owe the birth of the PAN (Fallaw, 2001; Knight, 1994). There are plenty of other cases of elite, well-to-do, and 'bourgeois' resistance, broadly defined: Brazilian planters' 'resistance' to abolitionism; the elite and middle-class xenophobia of Buenos Aires in 1919; the anti-populist military coups of the 1960s and '70s in South America; the cacerolazos of Allende's Chile. No doubt there are plenty of examples in Venezuela today. In this respect, just as we could inquire whether 'resistance' should be confined to intentional action, so, too, we could ask whether we are concerned only with resistance that is somehow popular, subaltern, or 'bottom-up' (to use a term much in vogue in recent Mexican revolutionary studies); and, if so, why? Should 'uncivil movements' of ('superordinate') resistance not figure as well (Payne, 2000)?

An open-minded and eclectic response might be to admit any form of 'resistance', whatever the social or political make-up of the resisters and their targets. If the Ku Klux Klan can be counted as a 'social movement' (Foweraker, 1995: 15), could it not be considered a form of racist 'resistance' too? However, the great majority of 'resistance' studies focus on popular/subaltern resistance. In this book, only Schell's paper could be said to address resistance which emanates from relatively better-off social groups. (To put it rather positivistically, I would bet that the mean income of members of the Damas Católicas - or, at least, of their families - was higher than the mean income of Mexicans as a whole). Of course, the justification for including the Damas (whom I would not wish to exclude for a moment, for all their middle-aged, frumpy, and unfashionable appearance) is that they confronted an oppressive state which sought to curtail or eliminate certain religious freedoms which they held dear. (There may well have been additional factors in play, such as Catholic opposition to Cardenista land reform, but, as the debate over Mexican Church-State conflict has advanced, few scholars would now choose to see either revolutionary anticlericalism or
Catholic resistance as mere ideological surrogates for 'deeper' class or material divisions: Butler, 2004). What this case reminds us is that 'resistance' can be deployed against both states and socio-economic elites (or both). And, as the Brazilian cases demonstrate, against official or established churches too; and certainly against ethnic or racial elites. Thus, even if the Damas were far from being socioeconomic subalterns, they saw themselves - and, arguably, in some objective sense, they were - politically subject to an oppressive anticlerical state. In other words, and at the risk of stating the obvious, hierarchies of sub- and superordination can be rigged according to different principles: socioeconomic, political, religious, ethnic, racial, gendered and generational. Often, such hierarchies cohere, displaying a kind of functional interdependence. It could be argued that hierarchical cohesion of this kind gave the Spanish empire a good deal of stability and even legitimacy, at least until the Bourbon reforms began to prise the mutually supporting hierarchies apart (Taylor, 1996). Conversely, 'great' revolutions may involve the simultaneous subversion of several intertwined hierarchies: socioeconomic, political, religious, and generational. More commonly, perhaps, run-of-the-mill resistance focuses on particular hierarchies - slave-owners, factory bosses, state officials, the Catholic clergy - and does not involve a frontal assault on the entire edifice of power and privilege. Indeed, resistance in one sector of contestation (let's say, the Church) may tend to promote 'quiescence' in another (hence, for example, the apparent political conservatism of Latin American Protestantism: Eckstein, 1989: 31-2). On the other hand, resistance may spill over, especially where hierarchies are closely intertwined and interdependent: 'no bishop, no king, no nobility', as King James I pithily put it (Hill, 1975: 32). We could refer to this as the contagion effect, which can operate both in reality and in perception - especially fearful elite perception.21

Mexico in the 1920s was a rather odd case, precisely because of the 1910 revolution, which had brought substantially greater political than socioeconomic change (in the 1930s, the socioeconomic 'deficit' would be somewhat made up). A regime of revolutionary newcomers now held power,
distributing land, supporting labour unions, and combatting the clergy. The 'relative autonomy of the (Mexican revolutionary) state' made it entirely possible for groups which remained socioeconomically privileged - but were now politically derogated - to turn against the state, deploying - as Fallaw describes for Yucatán - the 'weapons of the strong' (Fallaw, 2001). Jean Meyer also gives examples of successful Catholic colonization or co-optation of the state - or, to put it the other way round, the state's calculating collusion with vested interests, including the Catholic hierarchy (Meyer, this volume).

If, as I say, there are good reasons for keeping the Damas Católicas on board (at least with the qualification just mentioned), there are also good reasons, I think, for focusing on subordinate resistance (thus, on groups, well represented in this book, who are clearly socioeconomically and sometimes also legally and ethnically subordinate, like Brazilian slaves or Indians). In other words, we are not concerned with 'superordinate' or elite resistance - with military coups and middle-class protests, carapintadas and cacerolazos (Payne, 2000). There are two potential reasons for this. One is normative: if we aspire to a more just and less unequal society, we may wish to focus on the victims of injustice and inequality, the better to understand their predicament and further their cause. As I note in conclusion, this seems to be a quite common assumption, but it is open to serious question.

The second reason for focusing on subaltern resistance is empirical rather than normative and, in my view, much more compelling. Elites (and I use this term in a generic, imprecise sense to mean those at the top of the pile, those who are not members of the 'common folk') are by definition powerful: they enjoy a measure of economic, social, political and cultural power. Otherwise they wouldn't be elites. Subalterns don't enjoy such power; that's why they are subalterns. True, there may be intermediate groups whose location, interests and identity are open to dispute. (One advantage of the old Marxist formulation was that such groups - the vexatious petty-bourgeoisie, for example; perhaps the peasantry too - were destined to disappear, squeezed between what Gramsci called the two 'fundamental' classes of capitalist society, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: Rude 1980:9). Even if this
clearcut outcome has not occurred, the fact that class (or ethnic) divisions have not achieved binary simplicity does not prevent us from distinguishing elites and subalterns, while arguing, if we so choose, about the role of those caught in the middle. Indeed, most if not all social or cultural categories tend to be frayed at the edges. Just as it may be difficult to say where the elite (or the bourgeoisie) stops and where the subalterns (or the workers, peasants and 'common folk') start, so too it is hard to draw a definite line between, say, literate and illiterates, Indians and mestizos, or citizens, subjects and parochials (Almond and Verba, 1989). So, fuzzy borders are not an unusual or insuperable problem.

The previous point addresses the problem of complexity: we can accept that things are complex - including being fuzzy at the edges - without concluding that complexity and fuzziness make analysis impossible; or - a common outcome these days, I fear - that, having identified complexity and fuzziness, we have done our job and can all go home in a glow of scholarly satisfaction. Similarly, we must certainly recognize that history marches on, that things change, and that we are dealing with 'processes' and not timeless truths. (You might think that this statement of the blindingly obvious is also superfluous, except that, again, we find scholars congratulating themselves on discovering 'process' and berating those know-nothings who supposedly haven't. Stand by for further incisive updates on the religion of the Pope or the defecatory habits of bears). So, in this respect, we must recognise that hierarchies change. Sometimes hierarchies slip, as in Mexico after 1910. Even then, the usual result is a rejigging - by no means a complete abolition - of hierarchies. After 1910, the Church and landed class lost power, while the state, the revolutionary military and their popular allies gained power. Hence the Damas can be seen, at least in some measure, as (political) subalterns. Compared to Mexico, Russia and Cuba experienced more thorough-going revolutions, but hierarchies (of a very different kind) remained.

In the vast majority of societies, at least since the neolithic 'revolution' and the 'rise of the state', hierarchies have been entrenched (but not unchanging). This palpable fact governs any study of resistance. We could call elite control
and repression of subordinates 'resistance' (it might fit the original Dictionary of Physics definition quite well). But there are several objections to this eclectic approach: (i) again, it excessively expands and thus dilutes the concept of resistance; and (ii), more important, it suggests that resistance from above or from below, on the part of elites or subalterns, is much of a muchness: the same ideas, goals and methods can be discerned. But this is not the case. Subaltern or popular resistance differs from elite control and repression, in ways that I will shortly examine. Perhaps I am, yet again, stating the obvious; but, when dealing with Protean concepts, it may sometimes be worth doing that.

We should clear up another related point (which may also seem obvious). Subalterns are not homogenous and they are often found in conflict with one another. The squabbling pueblos of Oaxaca are notorious (Kearney, 1972; Dennis, 1976). The Mexican left, which supposedly stands for the subaltern, is nearly as bad. The Zapatistas, whom Womack depicted as united and mutually loyal, in fact fell prey to feuds and factions (Brunk, 1995). Yet more remarkably, subalterns can usually be found on both sides of the barricades when major revolts and revolutions are on the agenda. When, in 1712, Tzeltal Indians mounted a serious armed challenge to Spanish colonial rule (which, by most objective standards, was discriminatory and oppressive), many Indians opposed the rebellion (Viqueira, this volume). In Brazil, a century later, some - usually Brazilian-born - slaves sided with their masters against the protests and insurrections of fellow-slaves, usually African-born (Reis, 1995: 50, 142-3). Thus, definable subalterns are to be found fighting - 'resisting'? - fellow-subalterns; we have to recognize 'everyday forms of peasant collaboration' as well as peasant resistance (Ortner [1995]: 175, citing Christine Pelzer White). While noting this common phenomenon, which clearly impairs subaltern solidarity; and while trying to explain whether such fractures in subaltern society are produced by elite policies of divide-and-rule, by rational subaltern self-interest, or by lamentable 'false consciousness'; nevertheless, I am doubtful that we should refer to such phenomena as 'resistance', thus lumping them along with actions which display a clear
subaltern 'them-and-us' logic. Subalterns who - for whatever motive - ally with elites in a situation of social polarization (like the Tzeltal rebellion), are not practising resistance. They may be practising strategies of rational self-preservation or even self-advancement; they may be victims of 'false consciousness'; but they are clearly shoring up, rather than resisting, the prevailing social, economic, political and religious order. When, like the villages of Oaxaca, subalterns squabble among themselves, they are not necessarily practising 'resistance' (unless the squabbles are premised on some demonstrable hierarchy: mestizo pueblo against Indian, cabecera against sujeto, cacique against aggrieved people: de la Peña, this volume, gives some examples).

2. v: How Do They Resist?

'Resistance', therefore, should be reserved for conflicts in which a demonstrable inequality pertains, and in which that inequality is in some senses at stake. These are what Scott calls 'power-laden situations' (Scott 1990: x). Foucault might respond that all situations are 'power-laden', and 'where there is power, there is also resistance'; and Lila Abu-Lughod would cap that with 'where there is resistance there is also power (quoted in Gledhill, this volume). (Am I unusual in finding this sort of antiphonal chanting of portentous aphorisms just a shade wearisome?).24 So, perhaps resistance, like power, is everywhere, vested in every human action and relationship. Fine: but in that case our explanandum - the thing we are trying to explain - becomes so pervasive and ethereal that it defies explanation; we have concept-dilution of homeopathic proportions. Hence my attempt to draw some loose boundaries around the concept itself.

Resistance, then, derives its character in part from the social - and/or political, ethnic, cultural - make-up of the conflict (broadly speaking, subalterns against elites), in part from the characteristic modality of the conflict (since elites enjoy power, they can fight - they can resist resistance - by typically elite methods; subalterns, qua subalterns, have to use different methods),25 and in part from the goals, from the basic issues at stake, and
from the potential outcomes (basically, successful subaltern resistance implies a measure of popular empowerment and, perhaps, of material redistribution). These three dimensions of conflict hang together, giving the notion of resistance a measure of analytical coherence. For example, subalterns are by definition disadvantaged: economically, politically, or ethnically. They have fewer resources (in per capita terms) and, if they step out of line, they risk incurring the rigour of the law (often an arbitrary or personal kind of 'law', which is stacked against them). Hence, as Scott rightly stressed, subaltern resistance often has to be covert and pragmatic. Subalterns do, however, possess some limited advantages which elites do not: they are, almost by definition, more numerous; they know the lie of the land (literally, in many cases); hence they possess 'local knowledge'; and they have a strong incentive to fathom the mind of their masters (even, in the case of Brazilian slaves, to 'tame the master': Reis, this volume). The masters, on the other hand, can afford to be more cavalier in these matters: hence the very common phenomenon of landlords, bosses, políticos and colonial officials who grossly misjudge the temperament and intentions of their subordinates - attributing to them, at times, a spurious docile passivity and, at other times, a wild-eyed radicalism that, as I have said, may be greatly exaggerated.

On the basis of these limited - largely cognitive - assets, subalterns rely on rumour, gossip, evasion and duplicity to extract small advantages from the system. Cumulatively, this process might, as suggested, have systemic effects: for example, undermining the slave 'futures' market in Brazil (Slenes, this volume) or the productivity and profits of commercial enterprises. Hence the familiar litany of complaints about 'lazy natives' or - as Manuel Flon saw them - subversive Indian layabouts (Castro Gutiérrez, this volume). However, in the great majority of cases, enterprises and systems can live with this low-level 'resistance'. It may even function as a useful safety valve, keeping the engine of exploitation going. For resistance to become more pervasive, collective, overt, radical (in terms of methods or goals) and thus socially threatening, subalterns have to take a great many more risks (not least, the
risk of resorting to violence and thus inviting repression); and they have to achieve a measure of solidarity, to make their numbers count and to overcome the problem of 'free-riders' (those who, in a situation of conflict, wait and see, hopeful of deriving the benefits without incurring the risks: Olson, 1965).

A shift up the scale of resistance therefore has both organizational and ideological implications. 'Repertoires' of resistance change (Eckstein, 1989: 10; Tarrow, 1994: 33-45, 105-7). More overt resistance requires more overt organization: nocturnal machine-breakers turn to trade unionism; disgruntled campesinos litigate and petition for land; small guerrilla bands (some of them 'social bandits') cohere into larger forces which, in rare instances, achieve the critical mass of Pancho Villa's División del Norte. In the process, 'resisters' have to acquire some of the 'weapons of the strong', literally and metaphorically. Depending on circumstances, they need weaponry, finance, means of communication, even an incipient bureaucracy. The trend may be broadly civilian (the formation of trade unions) or military (the División del Norte again). They may also feel obliged to seek out allies, not necessarily of pristine 'subaltern' status (as Zapata did: Womack, 1969: chap. 10); to make necessary compromises and deals; and, in order to overcome the freerider problem, to resort to heavy-handed methods, ranging from forced military recruitment to the kind of 'pressing' which Joseph and Wells describe in their account of Yucatec Maya mobilization (Joseph and Wells, 1996: 232, 244). A similar process has been discerned in the more recent evolution of the '(new) social movements' of the 1980s and '90s, which, as they grew, also had to come to terms with a state apparatus which they had previously tended to spurn (Foweraker, 1995: 6-3, 70-1). At the risk of anthropomorphizing, we could see this as a kind of necessary 'loss of innocence', as an infant resistance (or 'new social') movement grows, consolidates, and acquires the necessary 'weapons of the strong' which will enable it to operate, now overtly and collectively, in the world of mass macro-politics. While romantics may lament the loss of innocence (just as they may exaggerate the noble character and achievements of the pristine movement), it seems to me that
there is a certain inevitability about this process. Unless the state 'withers away' - a Utopian promise which, as far as I can see, has rarely if ever been fulfilled27 - resistance/social movements have to achieve some sort of modus vivendi with the state, assuming they cannot take it over entirely. That was precisely the conclusion which the Catholic hierarchy correctly reached in Mexico in the late 1920s.

2.vi. Ideology
The process I have just described may also have an ideological dimension. I mentioned how, as the Mexican Revolution progressed and social polarization increased, the Zapatistas acquired more radical agrarian goals, which they sought to apply to the country as a whole, not just Morelos. Of course, the trend may go in a different direction, as power and success restrain an early popular radicalism, perhaps to the point where that old villain, 'Thermidorian reaction', hoves into sight. Apart from the French Revolution, examples might include the Bolivian MNR after 1952 (especially 1956); and any number of lesser movements - syndical insurgencies, for example, which began as subversive, democratic protests, but veered towards clientelism and careerism (for example, the Poza Rica section of the Mexican oil-workers union: Olvera, 1992). Some theorists of 'great' revolutions believe that each historical case experiences a common trajectory, characterised by discernible stages: moderate->radical->'reaction' (Brinton, 1938). This seems to be both a priori fanciful and a posteriori wrong. A more plausible rule-of-thumb, perhaps a sort of Hempelian 'covering law', would be Robert Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy', which posits - predicts? - a tendency towards the concentration of power in the hands of a directing minority, such as Mexico's comisariados ejidales, the local agrarian reform committees (Baitenmann, this volume).

While, in organizational terms, this may make some sense, as I have just suggested, it does not follow that concentration of power always means a loss of ideological radicalism. In ideological terms, the 'stage' theory of revolutions is not very convincing. The Cuban Revolution, though controlled by a narrow and enduring camarilla, has not hit the Thermidorian buffers. Sendero
Luminoso (as I understand it) was intensely centralized and radical at the same time. The civic movement which sprang up in the Mexican state of Guerrero in the early 1960s evolved from a broad, popular, democratic base to become more narrow, radical, militant and violent (Castellanos, 2007, p. 101ff.). (Again, I suspect that the PRIista state was probably happy with this trend and even took steps to encourage it). In other words, ideological trends obey no very clear pattern, whether at the level of major revolutions or lesser social/resistance movements. It all depends on the circumstances.

That does not mean, of course, that ideology is unimportant. The days when serious historians talked of 'prepolitical' peasants, locked in their tiny parochial microcosms, unable to rise above mundane - usually material - concerns or to formulate broad encompassing visions, are long gone (Hobsbawm, 1966). Recent research on Mexico has, indeed, stressed the early prise de conscience which affected large swathes of rural and provincial Mexico as early as the late Bourbon and independence periods (Guardino, 1996, 2005). Quite quickly, it seems, 'parochial' Mexican - Indians, mestizos and mulattos - began to talk of citizenship and citizens' rights and, even more important, they began to participate in elections and incipient political associations, like Oaxaca's 'oil' and 'vinegar' factions (Guardino, 2005). This phase of politicization was loosely liberal-democratic; but, as several chapters in this book demonstrate, religion - be it Catholic, candomblé, Kongo or millenarian - could also afford a powerful mobilizing and sustaining ideology.

While the nature of the ideology espoused by resistance movements is obviously important - Catholics and Communists tend to think and operate rather differently - I would suggest that the presence of an effective ideology may be just as important as the nature of the ideology per se. After all, ideologies are shifting and fungible. Liberalism - or nationalism - can be vehicles for both popular dissent and 'progressive' causes (anti-colonialism, the extension of the suffrage) and for elite, 'anti-popular' and downright reactionary projects (inter-war fascism; some varieties of neo-liberalism). Religion is notoriously fungible: as Thompson's brilliant dissection of nineteenth-century British Methodism showed, the same sect could legitimize
both Manchesterite factory-owners of the Gradgrind variety and - in the form of 'primitive Methodism' - early working-class solidarity and organization (Thompson, 1968: chap. 11). In Latin America, both Rerum Novarum (1891) and Vatican II (1963) helped promote a more pluralist, diverse and progressive Catholicism, so that priests and bishops could be found both supporting and denouncing the authoritarian regimes of the 1960s and '70s.28 Religion was 'not just an opiate' (Eckstein, 1989: 39; Levine and Mainwaring, 1989). It is, of course, possible to crosscut these conventional ideological labels - liberal, nationalist, Catholic, Communist - with alternative (usually 'etic') categories: we could distinguish - perhaps rather blandly and descriptively - between conservative, moderate and radical wings; we could adopt the Tillys' dichotomy of 'reactive' and 'proactive' ideologies/movements (Tilly, Tilly and Tilly, 1975: 50-5) or Rude's related dichotomy of 'inherent' and 'derived' popular ideologies (Rude, 1980: 30-3); and we could, if we were really feeble-minded, fall back on the old - in my view largely useless - dichotomy of 'modern' and 'traditional' (Knight, 2007a).

However, all these typologies suffer, in varying degrees, from the problem of being (i) rather vague and ad hoc (are candombé or the Catholic Church traditional or modern? Which bits are traditional or modern? Where would we locate our friends the Damas Católicas, who were distinctly 'traditional' in respect of dress and deportment, but quite 'modern' and innovative in their political conduct?); and (ii) overly idealistic, in the sense that these typologies exaggerate the power of ideas at the expense of historical context, immediate circumstances, and concrete group - or class - interests. The Zapatista movement was successfully revolutionary, even though its ideology was, in some respects, retrospective and restorationist (Knight, 1986, I). Brazilian millenarian movements may look like archaic recyclings of ancient medieval myths, but their socio-political impact has been radical and lasting (Pessar, this volume).

In some sense, I think, the ideologies associated with resistance are important less for their specific content, or their location on some (etic) scale of tradition/modernity or re-action/pro-action, than for their functional role in
making resistance possible and attractive. (I realise I am committing the cardinal sin of introducing the term 'function', while in the company of high-powered anthropologists). Compounding my sin, I would suggest - on the basis of the cases I know something about - that ideologies serve two related functions: they make sense of the world, linking specific, local struggles to grander causes and projects; and they help foster solidarity, by giving participants common ideas, rituals and a sense of dignity. As several analyses rightly stress, 'resistance' may have a strongly material emphasis, but notions of dignity and autonomy also seem to figure prominently: people object to being unjustly treated not just because it deprives them of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness', but also because it is basically unjust (Scott, 1990: 22-3. For this reason, incidentally, I think it is misleading to refer to Scott as 'a dreary realist' who is 'basically concerned' with 'bread-and-butter issue' to the exclusion of non-material factors: Guttman, this volume; Gledhill, this volume). Hence, when the tables are turned, we get the counter-humiliation of elites, such as the ladino women of Chiapas in 1712 (Viqueira, this volume): an example, perhaps, of 'expressive' as against 'instrumental' resistance. It is for this reason, too, that rational-actor models of protest are inherently limited (Zárate, this volume; Ecketin, 1989: 4-5): they miss the sense of 'injustice' and 'moral outrage' that often characterizes protest (Moore, 1987. 29 Thus, whether the grand ideology happens to be candomblé, Christianity, Communism, or even anti-globalization, it helps locate a specific struggle and its participants within a grander story, a story often replete with heroes, martyrs, and didactic narratives. It may also, in organizational terms, help local participants link up with powerful supralocal allies. In some (religious) cases, allegiance may also promise supernatural solace and assistance. Within the group, too, the associated rituals afford a basis for initiation and solidarity (Slenes, Pares, this volume): a particularly crucial factor in societies where subaltern organization is risky and hard to sustain.

3. 'False consciousness'?
Does it matter if the ideology is a pack of lies? Let me, finally, turn to the question of 'false consciousness'. I would distinguish between a 'thick' and a 'thin' version of this contentious thesis. The thin version recognizes that, for example, Catholicism and Communism are not easily compatible; they can't both be right. Resistance movements have been premised on both (perhaps most obviously in the case of the 'Resistance' in France after 1940). To the extent that either ideology can confer the kind of benefits I have just mentioned (affording global or universal references and fostering group solidarity), they can serve their turn: in the French case, they both bolstered resistance to the German occupation. Similarly, a range of 'Churches', broadly defined, have bolstered slave and black resistance in both Brazil and the Caribbean: Catholic, candomblé, santería, Anglican, Baptist. The 'choice' of one or other 'Church' derives from local or national circumstances; to put it differently (and pretentiously) it is a question of 'historicity'. The important thing is not which ideology or 'metanarrative' is 'chosen', but that there should be one and that it should be effective; its truth-value is secondary to its mobilizing and sustaining function. Confronted with movements of this kind - movements of subaltern resistance premised on ideas which we (or some of us) might find bizarre and even delusionary - we might nevertheless softpedal our intellectual misgivings on the grounds of practical efficacy. One does not have to be an Islamic 'fundamentalist' to appreciate why Hamas has a strong following in Gaza.

The 'thin' version of 'false consciousness' therefore give priority to efficacy over truth-value. Of course, 'efficacy' begs several questions, not least, the criteria against which 'efficacy' should be judged. Scott's analysis suggests that there are discernible subaltern 'interests': in order to evaluate the notion of 'hegemony', he argues, we need to 'assess the ways in which subordinate groups may be socialized into accepting a view of their interests as propagated from above' (Scott, 1990: 19-20). In some respects, I think this approach is fine: there are plenty of situations where we can reasonably state that the 'interests' of an individual or group are either advanced or prejudiced by certain events or processes. Being sold into slavery, having your village
lands expropriated, losing your job in a recession, being imprisoned without due process - the list of 'prejudicial' experiences is depressingly long.30 If we include considerations of personal dignity and autonomy among 'interests', broadly defined, the list is even longer, though not, for that reason, unmanageable. In many cases, derogations of material or political interests also involve slights against individual dignity (for example, in the case of the working-class in Porfirian Mexico: Anderson, 1976). We may not be able to calibrate the relative weight of, say material, political and 'psychological' factors (is the worst thing about unemployment the loss of income or the loss of dignity?), but when they tend in the same direction, there is no crucial dilemma. We can therefore reasonably speak of subaltern 'interests', thus of actions or decisions which promote or prejudice those interests; and we can hazard an opinion concerning the implications of a given ideology on those actions or decisions. The interests of black Africans were prejudiced by slavery; the interests of Brazilian Indians are prejudiced by indiscriminate logging. Ideologies of resistance - to slavery or logging - may not all be 'true' (we could easily envisage Marxist, Anarchist, Catholic, 'pagan', millenarian, and liberal ideologies serving such purposes; yet they cannot all be 'true'). But they might be effective, by exerting a strong appeal, fostering solidarity, and addressing the needs (interests) of the oppressed.

The 'thick' version of false consciousness comes into play, I would argue, when ideology militates against interests: when, in other words, subalterns are seen to act counter to their interests, apparently as a result of their misconstrual of their own interests, under the influence of a persuasive but 'deceptive' ideology. A powerful example - drawn from outside our cases, of course - would be lower-class Republican voters who, swayed by nationalism and religion, supported George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004. This is a powerful example, since (i) they exercised a free vote; (ii) their material interests were not served by Republican policies; and (iii) their reason for supporting Bush was, at least in part, a combination of American nationalism and evangelical Christianity. We could add, by way of further explanation, (iv) that the 'ideological hegemony' of religion and nationalism is actively maintained by a
barrage of media - film, TV, talk radio, country music, and the evangelical pulpit. Thus, to put it rather crudely, by way of emphasis, we have a' general public always easy prey to manipulation by television' and 'the crude politics of getting the people to vote against their own interests by frightening them with the Red Menace', or whatever 'horrendous foreign enemy' can be conjured up (Vidal, 2004: 6,84,109)

Of course, Scott (1990) argues that false consciousness and ideological hegemony are often illusory: subalterns maintain a facade of compliance, or even eager endorsement, behind which they grouse, grumble and resist. I many cases, I think, he is correct. He is particularly correct when dealing with highly authoritarian and hierarchical societies, in which there is no such thing as a 'free vote', hence apparent compliance may be no more than apparent; and in which neither the state nor the socio-economic elites have the will or the power to manufacture 'ideological hegemony'; instead, they rely on extreme and exemplary coercion.31 Several of the chapters in this book deal with similar - e.g, Brazilian slave - societies. Though not an expert, I would guess that Scott's analysis fits those societies pretty well. In other contexts, however, the 'poor Bushite Republican' example raises more tricky problems, since Scott cannot entirely dismiss Gramscian arguments of hegemony (or, in more extreme form, imputations of 'false consciousness'). He can, I think correctly, distinguish between 'thick' and 'thin' hegemony: the first entailing eager endorsement, the second grudging compliance - more or less what Gutmann calls 'defiant compliance' (Scott, 1990, chap.4; Gutmann, 2002). Regarding contemporary Mexico, quite a lot of what passes for political quiescence, 'consensus', or 'hegemony' is, I think, pretty grudging and cynical, based on a realistic expectation that the authorities are self-interested and that things are unlikely to change dramatically for the better. (We should note that this cynicism extends to much of the political Left as well). Almond and Verba (1989) drew similar conclusions some forty years ago; since then - since 1982, in particular, I would guess - grudging compliance has been common, irrespective of whether the PRI or the PAN has occupied Los Pinos;
hence the 'hegemony' of the Mexican state has tended to be of the 'thin' variety (Knight, 2007b).

The same could not be said of 'poor Bushite Republicanism', which, at least in its heyday, seemed to be vigorous, vocal, and, I repeat, antithetical to the basic interests of many poor Republicans. This anomaly, if indeed it is an anomaly, can be explained by at least three possible arguments: poor Bushite Republicans (i) being stupid and uneducated, fail to perceive their own interests; (ii) were briefly conned, and have since woken up to the fact; or (iii) (emically) rate their own 'interests' differently and, according to their own 'bounded rationality', see Bush Republicanism as the best available vehicle for their aspirations.

Since readers may grow impatient with this extraneous example, let me suggest that analogous problems are apparent in our own - Mexican and Brazilian - cases. When the rebels of Tehuantepec bowed to the bishop in 1660, they were perhaps engaged in a typically Scottian act of public deception; but maybe they genuinely revered the bishop and respected his authority. Some fifty years later, during the Tzeltal rebellion, plenty of Indians supported the Crown against the rebels (Viqueira, this volume). Two centuries later, tens of thousands of Mexican Catholics resisted the revolutionary state; many were of lower social class than the Damas Católicas and, in resisting the state, they were, in some measure, resisting land reform and supporting the landed class (Meyer, 1976). While their motives were mixed (again, grudging compliance with local landlord power was a factor), most recent studies stress the autonomous role of religion (Meyer, 1976; Butler, 2004). Thus, like poor Bushite Republicans, poor Cristeros made their political choices in part on the basis of religious beliefs, maintained, in the Cristero case, by an unusually powerful regional Catholic Church. Republican voters were also influenced by nationalism; and we do not have to accept the facile description of nationalism as a 'secular religion' to recognize that nationalism, like religion, offers a set of normative criteria which transcend those associated with collective or individual 'interests' (as mentioned above). In other words, while material or political interest may seem to mandate one
course (voting Democrat, petitioning for an ejido), religious or nationalist beliefs can trump 'interest', by stressing the superior claims of God and the Patria. These are non-commensurate criteria (unless we mistakenly believe that religion and nationalism can always be reduced to some prior 'interest', for which religion and nationalism are just contrived facades). And where such non-commensurate criteria are involved, it is very difficult to make the 'etic' argument that, say, the rank-and-file Cristeros, being victims of 'false consciousness', betrayed their own class interests by resisting the revolutionary state and supporting a phalanx of landlords and priests. They could reply that they were fighting for their immortal souls: what greater interest could there be than that? The real 'false consciousness', they might add, was that of the agraristas who, for a pittance of poor land, became the hired Cossacks of the atheistic state. Similar arguments could be made by nationalists (or 'patriots', as they usually prefer to be called). Indeed, it would be difficult to explain the hecatomb of the First World War without conceding a measure of genuine nationalism (e.g., in Britain before conscription was introduced in 1916): men volunteered and fought in part because of patriotic beliefs which permeated society; if we believe that those beliefs, and the action they mandated, were not conducive to the interests of the volunteers (who, of course, died in droves), then we are already in 'false-consciousness' country. And we only get out of it by postulating non-commensurate norms: voluntarily dying for your country (or being martyred for your religion), when individual and collective interests are not thereby served - and, indeed, are rather obviously prejudiced - can be justified if patriotic or religious values are allowed to trump 'interests'. I should add (i) that while this argument applies particularly forcefully to subaltern classes, it can apply to elites as well (many British elite families suffered heavily from First World War mortality); and (ii) it does not apply in blanket fashion to all wars, since some - the Second World War, for example, at least from the British or US viewpoint; as well as a good many wars of national liberation - could be said to involve a genuine collective interest, including the defeat of an oppressive colonialism. The argument similarly applies to most religions, but not all: apart from its transcendental
claims, Brazilian millenarianism also brought some very practical this-worldly benefits, by way of community order and stability in times of upheaval (Della Cava, 1968).

Finally, if 'false consciousness' or something like it exists, should scholars, when they encounter it, stoically accept it or, rather, set out to subvert it, thus helping the subalterns see the truth of their plight? Should scholars therefore study 'resistance' theories so that those theories can 'help us address novel ways of resolving such late modern plagues like poverty, racism and militarism' (Gutmann, this volume)? For anthropologists the problem is, I believe, quite familiar (the classic formulation being: should an anthropologist try to restrain some 'traditional' local practice which is palpably abusive - infanticide, honour killings, drunken violence - at the risk of being seen as 'pushy and judgemental aliens': Gutmann, 2002: 14). Historians, working at greater chronological distance, usually dealing with dead people, on the basis of written records rather than field work, face no such practical dilemma. The historical dye was cast long ago and no belated ex post intervention can make things better. However, historical research might have some beneficial future impact (for another time and place) and, certainly, several influential Latin American historians seem to see themselves as political activists, in the sense of writing history with one eye (if not two) on the practical political impact of their work (Joseph: 2001; Stern: 2001). And, even when the motive is not so explicit, a creeping tendency to romanticize and legitimize subaltern resistance is sometimes apparent; perhaps most commonly, this takes the form of drawing a veil over subaltern sins, while stressing the nobility of the subaltern cause (see, for example, Ortner's critique of Clendennin's portrayal of Mexico's Maya: Ortner, 1995: 177-8). Whitewashing the subaltern, Brown suggests, is a logical consequence of the decline of the old left and the rise of post-modernism (mentioned above): as the old normative struts are kicked away, social scientists of progressive bent have 'few options other than to make their case through rhetoric that projects moral fervour' (Brown, 1996: 729).
Speaking as a historian, for whom these dilemmas are less acute, I take the view that such instrumental or romantic engagements are best avoided (Knight, 2007c: 351-60). Of course, we all have our political preferences and, like it or not, they seep into our work. But so do typos and split infinitives and that is no reason to encourage them. Deliberately writing history to suit present and future political causes (in this case, by whitewashing subalterns) seems to me ill-conceived, for at least four principal reasons:

i. it is likely to be counter-productive (that is, it preaches to the converted and offends the rest);

ii. it is paternalistic (in effect, it censors the people being studied);

iii. it rather arrogantly assumes that history matters in the 'real world' (here I confess to being a 'dreary realist'); and

iv. most important, it mixes up 'is' and 'ought', empirical data and value judgements, which should be kept apart, as far as possible. We may want our subalterns to be enlightened and egalitarian; and we may want the world to be enlightened and egalitarian; but these are normative aspirations (not necessarily shared by all: hence point [i] above) and they cannot affect what, in Hexter's phrase, actually 'happened to happen' in history.

I readily concede that the anthropologists' dilemma is different and more acute (since objection [iii] above counts for less: they may actually be able to achieve practical positive results: for example, de la Peña, this volume). If research serves to compromise subaltern resistance, or to give aid and comfort to elites (as Stoll's critique of Rigoberta Menchú presumably did), should that research not be done (Arias: 2001)? Or, when done, not published?34 And does it matter if, in pursuit of subaltern resistance, Menchú got a few - quite important - facts wrong? Perhaps the end justifies the means.

My personal feeling is that, at a time when respect for the unvarnished truth seems to be wilting,35 there should be a powerful bias in favouring of following the old Easy Rider slogan, to 'tell it like it is';36 even if, at times, the telling of it may prove unpalatable - when, for example, we find credulous or cruel subalterns, behaving opportunistically and self-seekingly. After all, they probably learned all this sort of thing from their supposed betters.
1. While I draw on the studies presented here, I do not presume to summarize or critique them. In addition, I am drawing on the versions which I read, some of which have since changed (or fallen by the wayside).

2. If such a body of 'theory' can be said to exist (hence the quotation marks). There is clearly an ample and growing literature, but whether the sheer quantity justifies the (qualitative) attribution of a 'theory', with its presumption of consensus and coherence, is another matter.

3 It is not clear to me why the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites - thus of most 'really existing socialism' - should have resulted in the root-and-branch discrediting of socialism, given that it was the previous existence and character of the Soviet Union (e.g., in its heyday, under Stalin), which had already done much of the discrediting.

4 In this, the politólogos of Latin American may be fortunate, since they began their great regime-transition route march back in the 1960s and '70s, in the gloomy lowlands of democratic breakdown and authoritarian regime-building; they then marched en masse up the sunlit slopes of democratization to the summit of democratic-regime-consolidation; so, if the worse comes to the worst, they can, like the Grand Old Duke of York, march their men all the way back down again. I should stress that these observations on social-science trends are necessarily based on a limited and no doubt ethnocentric (perhaps 'Anglo-Saxon') perspective.

5 All these terms were taken from papers given in the course of this project; it does not follow that every term from every paper has found its way into the final published book. That winnowing does not, however, affect my basic argument.

6 By 'small' I do not refer to the scope or significance of the concept, but rather its relative novelty, hence its lack of scholarly citation, discussion, and salience.

7 It may be that, within some 'epistemic communities' - e.g., academics who read and cite each others' work, while speaking the same, sometimes arcane, language - these concepts are thought to be 'sufficiently theorized'. However, modern academia contains many - perhaps too many - 'epistemic communities', and some of them are relatively small and introverted.

8 The process is analogous to that described by E. H. Carr (1964: 12-13) whereby, with time, research and debate, a 'mere fact' becomes a 'historical fact'.
9 I am using 'elites' simply as shorthand for 'those who are not subalterns and who have power over subalterns' (an ugly alternative would be 'superordinates'). Hence I do not think an excursion into 'elite theory' (Pareto, Mosca, etc.) is necessary.

10 Thus, after 1789, even moderate movements of social and political reform were, in Britain, regarded as dangerously radical: 'the result . . . ', Thomis and Holt argue, 'was often the creation of revolutionaries where none had previously been': (Tarrow, 1994: 76).

11 'Indexicality', as I understand it, refers to the basic problem of interpretation which arises as concepts are traded across cultural boundaries (which may or may not be linguistic); thus, apart from 'translation' in the literal sense, it is questionable how far terms, like 'resistance', can be taken to mean the same thing in contrasting contexts: Welch (1993): 6-7.

12 The lack of fit between goals and outcomes is particularly apparent in the history of revolutions which, as Skocpol (1979: 14-18) argues, are less 'purposive' and voluntaristic than is often supposed: 'revolutions are not made; they come'.

13 There are no case studies of trade union resistance in this book, even though unionization must surely qualify as a principal form of resistance in urban industrial societies (including contemporaray Mexico and Brazil). Some scholars, it is true, regard unionization a little askance: being 'centralized, hierarchical and often clientelistic' organizations, unions have sometimes been differentiated from 'social movements', which are supposedly 'decentralised, non-hierarchical . . . open, spontaneous, fluid and participatory' (Foweraker, 1995: 43). For similar reasons, unions have also been termed 'interest groups' rather than social movements (Tarrow, 1994: 15). I am not persuaded that these distinctions, to the extent that they are empirically valid, should debar trade unions from consideration in this context; resistance can be - and sometimes has to be - hierarchical, and maybe centralized and even clientelistic.

14 Eckstein (1989: xi) includes 'pilfering' along with 'footdragging . . and passive non-compliance'; see also Scott (1989), 118.

15 While a good deal of resistance - especially low-level, quotidian, discreet resistance - can be analysed in terms of instrumental calculation by 'rational actors', there is much more to it than that (in other words, rational actor models are seriously deficient). Some protest involves 'expressive' or 'affective' actions: cutting loose, having a good time, flaunting a newfound freedom, humiliating old oppressors. This aspect of resistance is captured in the phrase current during the Mexican Revolution (and other rebellious or riotous events in Mexico): 'ir a la bola' ('to join the party'). Clearly, this differs from classic 'Scottian' resistance.
What follows is a fairly stripped-down set of permutations; Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 544) offer a more elaborate typology of 'types of resistance' involving 7 categories x 3 perspectives = 21 variants.

Recent terrorist attacks (9/11 especially) have obviously had major consequences, not least because governments have chosen to react in consequential ways; however, it is not clear that those consequences have furthered the terrorists' cause(s) (e.g., evicting the Americans from the Middle East, empowering the Palestinians, overthrowing the House of Saud, establishing a new caliphate), unless that cause is reduced to a somewhat nihilistic politique du pire.

An extreme but exemplary case would be the massacre in El Salvador in 1932, when rebels may have been responsible for up to 35 deaths, and the government killed 10,000 or more in response: Anderson (1971: 134-7).

Regimes may be restrained by the self-interested calculation that extreme repression may invite yet more violent and radical resistance; or by norms - paternalist, religious, humanitarian - which mandate certain kinds of conduct (for example, on the principle of noblesse oblige). Needless to say, there are many counter-examples; but the fact of regime restraint and proportionality should not be overlooked, especially by those advocating different strategies of resistance.

I should add that, in the end, the regime cracked down on the Anti-Reelectionists, driving at least some of them to open rebellion; which rebellion, to general surprise, succeeded, thus initiating the Mexican Revolution.

There are counter-examples where, far from seeing contagion, analysts discern compartmentalization: that is, resistance in one area of contestation may induce passivity in others. Evangelical Protestantism in Latin America challenges the Catholic Church - it can be seen as a form of religious defiance (ergo resistance) - but, in many cases, 'its political impact tends to be conservative': Eckstein (1989): 31-2.

In other words, I do not think it is necessary to make elaborate excursions into 'elite theory', with citations of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, et al.

The petty bourgeoisie has survived, of course, while the 'new managerial class', has grown. Peasants, who have historically formed a large proportion of both the Mexican and Brazilian populations, have declined in relative numbers; and their decline is all the greater if we accept the argument of Roger Bartra (and others) to the effect that contemporary Mexican peasants are often 'disguised proletarians' (specifically, piece-rate workers): see Bartra (1993). To the extent that Bartra is right, which he may well be, Mexican rural society has tended towards - without actually reaching - a dichotomous capitalist/proletarian class formation; a matter of some significance, especially
if we accept that different classes and class antagonisms tend to produce
different kinds of conflict or, if you prefer, resistance.

24 Even if unusual, I am not alone: for a distinctly dyspeptic reaction, see

25 Of course, different methods of resistance are apparent among subalterns,
and a good deal of effort has gone into differentiating those methods (e.g.,
strikes, sabotage, land seizures, riots, revolts, revolutions); some are
discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Here, I am simply distinguishing generic
'subaltern' from 'superordinate' strategies.

26 This seems to me a crucial point which would repay further investigation.
Scott (1990) stresses subaltern canniness and percipience; Gutmann (2002:118-19, 123, 135) expresses doubts and points to the limitations of subaltern
knowledge and horizons. I think both are right: that is, in some situations,
subalterns possess a thorough and shrewd grasp of circumstances (as Scott
argues); in others, they are constrained by lack of information (and education)
or by flagrant misconceptions about the world (for example, some notions of
'naive monarchism', to the extent that they are genuinely held and are not
mere discursive facades). I should add that elites are similarly fallible. I return
to this point, very briefly and superficially, when, in conclusion, I touch on
'false consciousness'. The interesting task, in my view, would be to distinguish
between circumstances where subaltern canniness is apparent and those
where it is not. I suspect that the contrasting patterns obey a kind of
situational logic and are not merely random.

27 I am referring, of course, to the benign and progressive 'withering away' of
the exploitative state proposed by Marx, not the kind of 'state failure' - or
outright state collapse - which is associated with civil war, balkanization and
warlordism.

28 Again, the patterns were not wholly random. The Brazilian Church tended
to be more socially progressive and politically hostile to the authoritarian state
than either its Argentine or Mexican counterparts.

29 Unless, of course, we read 'injustice' as 'disutility'. However, recasting
complex human feelings in terms of a basic binary, utility/disutility, not only
grossly simplifies, by reducing non-commensurate values to a phony
common currency; it also leads to a reductio ad absurdum, whereby any
course of action - including St Simeon Stylites sitting atop his pillar with his
withered arm held aloft - could be said to maximize 'utility' (in this case, a
Christian-ascetic 'utility').

30 Such experiences can, of course, be justified, in somewhat Panglossian
manner, by the argument that short-term disadvantage translates into long-
term advantage (for example, expropriating inefficient peasant plots leads to
a more efficient agriculture and superior welfare for all, or most). But there
are circumstances in which this argument clearly does not hold (e.g., slavery); and even when it does, the eventual (subaltern) beneficiaries are not usually the same people as the immediate (subaltern) victims; the trade-off spans regions or generations. Hence it remains valid to speak of objective interests being prejudiced.

31 Not surprisingly, many of the examples deployed in Scott (1990) derive from systems of serfdom and slavery, such as Tsarist Russia and the antebellum South, and focus on 'slaves, serfs, untouchables, the colonized and subjugated races' (Scott, 1990: xi). Literate, liberal, urban, industrial societies figure very little.

32 Or race. Here, the US presidential election of 2008 may afford some apposite evidence.

33 Of course, religion can sometimes afford a facade behind which political and personal opportunism lurks: a relevant example is given by Butler (1999).

34 In this case, motives might be relevant: was Stoll seeking celebrity, money, or the plain unvarnished truth? But motives are hard to get at, and may well be mixed.

35 I refer not just to diplomats - who are 'sent abroad to lie for their country' - or politicians, who readily do so both home and abroad; but also journalists working for supposedly reputable broadsheets, such as the New York Times; and even historians: see Hoffer (2004).

36 The more traditional academic formulation is Ranke's, to the effect that historians should recount 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' ('how it really was': Carr [1964]: 8-9). Ranke is rightly criticized for preaching a rather spurious positivism (hence I prefer the Easy Rider version); however, criticism of Rankean positivism justifies neither an abandonment of the goal of objectivity, nor a flight into the stratosphere of subjectivity.


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